summarizes explicit general requirements imposed on the architecture design from the point of view of its compliancy with the FIPA system standards, transparency, legacy systems compatibility, reliability and optimal performance. Table 1 -Requirement Specification -General Requirements
ID Requirement
The resulting architecture should fit into the FIPA compliant system standard [1] G1.1 Security services should be transparent whether within or outside an Agent Platform (AP). G1. 2 An agent residing on an insecure platform (i.e. with enabled secure mechanisms) should be able to receive insecure messages, e.g., from outside of the AP. Whether the agent is willing to respond in an insecure way or at all depends on the agent itself.
G1
G1. 3 Messages should consist of a FIPA compliant, non encrypted envelope 4 extended by encryption information as well as of a plain or encrypted content of the message. Furthermore, authenticity of the envelope should be easily verifiable as well. G2 The resulting architecture should be vendor, patent, proprietary algorithm independent. G3 The resulting architecture should be available and reliable. G4 All the necessary security infrastructure should be accessible within an AP. If any security service requires an inter-platform communication, this should be transparently provided by trusted AP's mediators. G5 For performance and maintenance reasons, the resulting architecture should enable security based on trusted relationships and thus request/service delegation. E.g., an agent authenticated in his Home Agent Platform (HAP) is trusted in an adjacent AP which shares the trusted relationship with this HAP. G6 All the security services should be transparent to an agent. G7 The security architecture should be easily applicable to and integrable with any legacy system. G8 The architecture should support administrative domains in order to avoid administration troubles. G8.1 It should be possible to settle administrative domains in a hierarchical way so that one can be immersed to another. G8. 2 In any domain it should be possible to specify groups and roles assignable to agents belonging to that domain. Table 2 defines the basic set of security services related to the platform and agent security, security threads resistance, security polices and authentication mechanisms. Dependencies among particular architectural security services are depicted in Fig. 1 . Filtering. This policy enables to filter incoming messages according to the source address, authentication, etc. Filtering should be performed within agents.
S5
Resulting security level should be derived from security requirements of an agent and its HAP. S6
An AP should be able to force its agents to start using a security mechanism.
S7
The architecture should be open for additional security services as availability, accounting, accountability, etc. These services are too sophisticated to be included into the basic security model but it should be possible to add them easily. S8
There should be specified interfaces supporting both a symmetric, i.e. a private key, and an asymmetric, i.e. a public-key, encryption. S9
An agent, accessing a service, should prove its identity, if its HAP is insecure, the service is not public, and/or the authentication is just required. S10 Every agent should be able to authenticate at least in its HAP. S11 Every service provider, including the public one, i.e. a mediator, running on an insecure AP and providing data should authenticate to its client. S12 Identity of an agent should be proved by a time limited certificate issued by an authorization authority as the AMS or the PKI maintainer.
DESIGN DECISIONS
It seems reasonable to suppose an agent platform to be either secure or insecure. The decision about platform security (and security policy) is up to the platform owner. If an agent within a platform requires some security mechanisms (authentication, confidentiality, message protection, etc.) and its home platform does not support it, an error message is returned.
The inter-and intra-platform security should be distinguished because of considerable inherent differences: The inter-platform security concerns larger agent communities, e.g., the Internet, whereas the intra-platform security will be used in smaller communities, e.g., on a factory floor. It is apparent there are a bit different requirements in both cases concerning performance 6 and features they provide, e.g., agents on a factory floor can be supposed to provide much more prolific repertoire of services than their open-community counterparts, they could require the control access support for their particular services (not for the agent as a whole), etc.
There will be both the symmetric (shared secret key) and the asymmetric (public key) crypto algorithms employed depending on wether we deal with the interplatform or the intra-platform security.
Inter-platform security will be provided by two means: trusted platforms and the public-key cryptography.
The term trusted platforms means that AMS's of both AP's share a secret key and they mutually trust in provided authentication information, i.e. certificates. This technique is available, e.g., within an enterprise, it is simple and does not require the sophisticated PKI infrastructure. Some potential issues can stem from the trust intransitivity. In addition, every platform or a trusted group of platforms can have its own public key which authenticates it within the agent universe.
In an open environment, e.g., the Internet, the public-key cryptography is much more applicable. The main advantage is the possibility of hierarchical certification, the main drawback 7 is the complexity of maintaining (and assuring security of) such hierarchical certificates. Of course, it is possible for a single agent to have its own public key, if necessary.
Intra-platform security requires the same security mechanisms as in the case of the inter-platform security but, in addition, some mechanism, e.g., the single service access control, should be provided. This can be done in a Kerberos-like manner. All security mechanisms should be implemented using the symmetric key encryption.
Trust Relation
To reason about trust within and among AP's we introduce the trust relation by the following definition:
Definition: As the trust it is meant a binary relation defined as 
4.
B A B A T T Û Þ , By a nonce, in the context of the protocols, it is denoted an arbitrary piece of data, the only condition that has to hold is that both the agents know the transformation nonce+1 so that the agent which generated that nonce knows which value to expect after the transformation. The main reason for introducing a nonce is the countermeasure against the reply attack and a proof that the counterpart understands the message.
Authentication
Identity of an agent will be proved for other agents by a certificate issued by a trusted authority (TA) . If the identified agent does not possess its public key, the certification authority will be its home TA, otherwise the certificate can be issued by any AP. The issued certificate will be valid within the authorizing TA's AP only. Part of the certificate will be a secret session key used for the consecutive session.
The following prepositions are assumed to be valid: 1. A TA trusts an agent if the agent proves its identity by a secret key (sometimes called the master key) shared between the agent and the TA.
The TA then attests this trust by issuing a certificate. After the certificate delivery, the proposition HAP TA HAP agent T @ @ Û is valid. This type of certification will be possible only within the agent's HAP. 2. A TA trusts an agent if the agent proves its identity by its public key which is certified by the PKI authority. The TA then assets this trust by issuing a certificate and it holds HAP TA HAP agent T @ @ Û . This type of authorization is possible even across APs. 3. A certificate issued by a TA is issued for one specific agent. If the agent being authenticated needs to be authenticated to another agent, it needs a new certificate issued for that another agent. 4. An agent a@HAP trusts another agent b@HAP if that agent possesses a valid certificate issued by its home TA agent ams@HAP. 5. The trusted AP relationship means that the trusted APs share secret keys which allows their mutual authentication. 6. The shared secret key for AP's trust will be held by TAs of the trusted APs. 7. Trust is not transitive in general, transitivity, i.e.
holds within the trusted platforms only, i.e. where
In principle, we can distinguish the following authentication cases: · Authentication within an AP without a Public Key. This is the most common generic way to authenticate within an AP, see Fig. 2 (1). The TA issues a certificate to the agent A, authenticating A to B, as TA proved its identity by acquaintance of the shared secret key. The certificate contains a session key which identifies the agent A to B. · Authentication within an AP with a Public Key. See Fig. 2(2) . This method works as in the case 1, but the public key is used for authentication. Communication 2 and 3 serves for acquiring the valid public key to verify the agent's identity. · Authentication in a trusted AP without a Public Key. See Fig. 2(3a) . In this case, the scenario is: 1. A acquires an authentication certificate issued by the home AMS and 2. In virtue of the certificate, A acquires another certificate valid in the adjacent trusted platform AP 2 . · Authentication in a trusted AP with a Public Key. See Fig. 2(2), or 2(3b) . · Authentication in a non-trusted AP with a Public Key. See Fig. 2(2) . This is the most general way to get the certificate.
In all the mentioned cases, the result is a valid authentication certificate usable in the destination platform. A direct authentication with a public key, i.e., without any mediation with an AMS it is not prohibited but it is not recommended.
Access control
The access control (i.e. authorization) to agent's resources will be provided by the following means: This implies that the service providing agent has to maintain a list of authorized agents, i.e. their AID's, and operations granted to them. b) An access to particular resources will be granted by a voucher issued either by a TA, e.g. the DF, or the service providing agent. Access to the requested resource/service will be granted in exchange for that voucher 8 . c) Access is based on mapping domain access rights appertaining to an accessing agent the rights of the local system. For the rights mapping, the resource providing agent will be responsible. Such a mapping makes the system interoperable with legacy systems with its own access control mechanism.
The approach ad a) can be denoted as a traditional approach, well known from the client/server applications. It is feasible for resources with few accessing agents as the overhead caused by the access control list maintenance increases with the number of accessing agents. The approaches ad b) and c) move the access control responsibilities to a central location, thus those methods are feasible for environments having large number of agents. Utilization of AID for decision making on access rights to services implies that the very first authentication should proceed as early as during agent's registration to an AMS. The architecture relies on three types of vouchers: · Time limited voucher granting access to the service for all time of its validity and bound to its holder it was issued for. This type of the vouchers will be issued by the DF according to the AP's access control policy. · Voucher application limited, negotiable, and by the Transaction Fairness Service registered. Every application has to be mediated by the Transaction Fairness Service. This type of voucher can be issued by the service provider. · Portable and platform independent voucher digitaly signed by a TA. As a part of the voucher information on administrative domains, roles, and groups assigned to the agent will be included. Administrative domains are introduced to maintain the access control lists easily and are proposed to be settled hierarchically above the FIPA agent platforms.
CONCLUSIONS
Basic efforts aimed at achievement of FIPA agent security, which are currently being implemented within our multiagent infrastructure, are discussed in the paper. To be honest, there are additional requirements concerning the FIPA standard augmentation to support the proposed architecture -namely introduction of publickey infrastructure agent and accounting and trusted arbiter agent -which were not discussed and depart beyond the limited extent of the paper.
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